Pakistan strongly condemns /
The Pakistani
There are no Pakistani army-funded training camps /
We hope this will not derail the peace process started with the recent
We stand by /
Signed,
Asif Ali Zardari
President, Pakistan /
Kantak’s Potpourri is a personal exploration of risk, information security, governance, and data privacy—blending practical insights, regulatory perspectives, and real-world examples. From evolving cyber threats and identity risks to frameworks like DPDPA and GDPR, the blog offers thought-provoking views to help navigate today’s digital and compliance landscape.
Contents
- Preamble
- The Considerations That Led to the Selection of HDW
- The Considerations That Led to the Selection of HDW
- The May 1977 Delegation to Evaluate European Submarine Building Yards
- The May 1979 Policy Technical Delegation to Italy, Germany and Sweden
- Indo German 'Agreement on Technical Assistance'
- Contracts Signed on 11 December 1981
- Contracts Signed on 11 December 1981
- Teams Deputed to Germany for Overseeing Construction and Design Technology
- Submarine Construction Schedule
- Commencement of the Type 1500 Design by IKL
- Transfer of Submarine Design Technology
- Construction of SSKs 1 and 2 in Germany
- MDL's Submarine Construction Facilities
- Construction of SSK 3 and 4 in Mazagon Docks
- Dropping of SSKs 5 and 6 and Discontinuance of Indigenous Submarine Construction
In the 1960s, the conventional wisdom, based primarily on Western naval journals, was that “Russian submarines were noisy and that Western submarines were quieter”. In the deadly game of hunter killer submarine warfare, where one submarine stalks another submarine deep under the sea, the quieter submarine has the advantage of being able to detect earlier, the noisier submarine.
As early as 1960s, the Navy started considering the construction in India of smaller SSK submarines specifically for submarine versus submarine operations.
By 1969, ideas crystallized to build small SSK submarines in India in collaboration with a European firm, on lines similar to what was being done for surface ships in the Leander Frigate Project. Discussions had been initiated with Dr Gabler, the reputed and experienced designer of German submarines during World War II.
What started as a project to build small submarines gradually ballooned into a larger coastal submarine. By the time Dr Gabler's design met the Navy's staff requirements, its cost had overshot the resources available. These discussions however, helped the Navy to understand the complexities of submarine design and the tradeoffs that had to be made in the 'staff requirements'.
Since foreign exchange was always a constraint on acquiring ships, submarines or aircraft from European sources, enquiries were initiated with the Soviet Union. Their response was that they did not have any submarines of the size and characteristics that the Navy wanted, but they could design one.
After the 1971 Indo Pakistan War, the project for indigenous submarine construction resumed momentum. In response to enquiries for constructing SSK submarines in India, proposals were received from the reputed submarine manufacturers of Europe.
Evaluation of these proposals helped to update the staff requirements for a SSK submarine of about 1,500 tonnes.
A delegation visited Sweden in 1973 to discuss the feasibility of collaborating with Kockums for building submarines in India.
The steep rise in oil prices after the 1973 Arab Israel War perpetuated the shortage of foreign exchange and the SSK project had to be deferred. Comparative evaluation continued of the various proposals.
A study was also carried out as to which of the shipbuilding yards Mazagon Docks in Bombay or Garden Reach in Calcutta or Hindustan Shipyard in Vizag should undertake the SSK project. Submarine fabrication required specialised heavy duty machines. For fabricating the hull, the shipyard had to have a Plate Bending Machine to bend the ring frames made of special, 35 mm thick, steel plate. The shipyard had to have Platter and Assembly Shops for profile cutting and edge preparation of these thick steel plates prior to welding. Highly specialised welding skills were required to weld these ring frames together to form a circular pressure hull, which would withstand the crushing pressure of the sea at deep depth.
Mazagon Docks in Bombay had some of these machines in its yard where oilrigs were being fabricated for the Bombay High Offshore oilfield. And Mazagon Docks was near to the engineering subcontractors in the Bombay industrial area to whom the machining and fabrication of non-critical jigs and fixtures could be entrusted. It was decided that Mazagon Docks was best suited for collaboration in the building of SSK submarines. MD started preparing for this project.
Also by 1979, the Navy was able to evaluate in great detail the pros and cons of the German HDW Type 1500 and Kockums Type 45, both of which were still on the drawing board. Kockums shipyard, despite being highly automated (all designing was done by computer, without the help of a scale model) and having excellent infrastructure, had not exported any submarines and their experience was limited to building submarines of 1,400 tons for the Swedish Navy. On the other hand, the HDW shipyard had built 130 submarines for the German Navy, had exported 60 submarines. It was building submarines for numerous countries and was backed by the design organisation IKat Lubeck. IKhad an efficient design facility founded by Dr Gabler and fully backed the HDW shipyard in submarine design.
The Considerations That Led to the Selection of HDW
In 1975, the Apex Defence Review Committee supported the Navy's proposal for constructing submarines. The Soviet Union had already indicated that it did not have submarines of the size that the Navy was looking for. In 1977, Government accepted the requirement for looking at alternate sources for building submarines.
The May 1977 Delegation to Evaluate European Submarine Building Yards
The delegation was led by Rear Admiral NP Datta and comprised three submariners Commanders (X) VS Shekhawat, (L) Thukraand (E) Chaudhury.
Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) NP Datta recalls:
“As DCNS, I was part of the delegation which went in 1977 to five European countries France, Germany (two shipyards in Germany), Holland and Sweden to evaluate the various types of submarines offered to us. We shortlisted two possible sources of cooperation. These were the two German shipyards and the Swedish Kockum shipyard.
“We ruled out the French Agosta primarily because it was too small for our requirement, it was not fully tropicalised and they had no great advantage in sensors and weapon systems over the Russian submarines that we had.”
Commander (later Admiral) VS Shekhawat (who had commanded submarines) recalls:
“I accompanied Admiral Datta to Europe in the early part of 1977. We visited shipyards in Germany, Sweden, Holland and France to see what they had to offer which could be compared with the earlier Swedish offer, both in technological terms as well as in financial terms, transfer of technology, support, documentation, etc.
“The visit to France was disappointing. They were reluctant to even show us their Agosta class submarine. After some pressure had been exercised, they agreed to take us to see an Agosta that was building in Cherbourg.
“As far as the Dutch submarine was concerned, it was too small for our requirement though they showed us two submarines of a very interesting design.
“Germany's HDW seemed well positioned to build submarines for us. They had already supplied a number of submarines to other countries. They had the background and experience of the German Submarine Fleets during the First and Second World War a considerable body of experience and data available from what were extensive seagoing operations. And German Industry, both prewar and postwar, had a reputation for engineering skills and thoroughness.
“Having studied the Kockums submarine theoretically and having had a glimpse of the HDW facilities and visited a submarine being built for a South American country, my own views were that eventually it did not very much matter which of these two submarines we went in for because the idea was that we should develop the capacity to design and build for ourselves.”
Captain M Kondath was the Director of the Submarine Arm and dealt with the SSK Project from 1977 until the contract was signed in 1981. He recalls:
“In the Directorate of the Submarine Arm, we analyzed the report of this 1977 delegation. When it was put up the Government, the Ministry suggested that every submarine building shipyard, including Russian, should be invited to offer their proposals. Britain did not respond except for offering their wire guided torpedoes.
“Formal proposals were received from:
- Howal Deutsch Werke (HDW) of Kiel, Germany for their Type 2091.
- Thyssen Nord See Werke (TNSW) of Emden, Germany for their Thyssen 1500/1700.
- Italcantieri of Italy for their 'Sauro' class.
- DTCN of France for their 'Super Agosta' class.
- Kockums of Sweden for their Type 45 B/Naaken.
- Nevesbu of Holland for their 'Swordfish” class.
- Vickers of Britain for the wire guided Tigerfish torpedo.
“A paper evaluation was carried out of these offers. Based on this initial evaluation, the shipyards were requested to indicate if they were prepared to modify their design or alternatively design a submarine to meet the Navy's staff requirements. Holland and France declined and withdrew from the list of contenders.
CCPA Approval in Principle
“Approval in principle' was accorded in February 1979 for the induction of four submarines from non Soviet sources, two to be built abroad and two to be built in India. The total outlay estimated at that time was Rs 350 crore (including Rs 275 crore in foreign exchange). Mazagon Docks, which was to build the submarines, was to invest around Rs 10 crores on infrastructure. Approval was also accorded for setting up a Negotiating Committee.”
The May 1979 Policy Technical Delegation to Italy, Germany and Sweden
The Shipyards were informed of the points that the Indian side wanted included in an inter Government MOU:
- The foreign shipyard has the necessary authorization of its Government to sell submarines to India.
- The shipyard is authorized to collaborate with India for constructing submarines in India under license and with provision for incorporation of subsequent improvements and modifications.
- Assurance of the supplier Government for continued product support in alights aspects for the life cycle of the submarines or for 25 years.
- Similar assurance that no prohibitions or restrictions will be imposed by the supplier Government on the supply and services and continued flow of product support for that period.
- Authorizing the shipyard for transfer of the full range of technology for the construction of submarines in India.
- Transferring from the supplier's Navy the full range of design technology for the development of submarine design capability in India.
- Government clearance for sale to India of connected weapons, armament, sensors, machinery and systems.
- Support by the supplier Navy for the training of:
o Naval and Dockyard personnel for the operation, maintenance, repair and overhaul of submarines and the related systems.
o Naval crew in all aspects of submarine warfare including tactical doctrines and electronic warfare, consistent with national commitments.
o Indian personnel for the logistic support for the submarine and its systems.
- Quality control, certification, trials and acceptance of the submarine and its related systems by the supplier's Navy and supply of necessary documentation.
- Assurance by both sides regarding security of information and equipment.
- Consultations between the two Governments to resolve problems, if any, arising out of the implementation of the collaboration project.
Indo German 'Agreement on Technical Assistance'
As a policy, the German Government avoided defence supplies that might aggravate tension. After the 1971 Indo Pakistan War, the Indian subcontinent had been declared an area of tension. It was also reluctant to supply defence equipment to non NATO countries because such equipment might be used against their allies.
In the end 1970s and early 1980s there was skepticism in Germany, France, Britain and Italy, that if the scope of defence cooperation with India was enhanced, India because of its close relationship with the Soviet Union may not be able to protect NATO hi-tech information from Soviet espionage.
In view of these considerations, India considered it essential, as a measure of abundant caution, that before contracts were signed, there should be agreement at the Government to Government level to safeguard Indian interests. The 1979 Delegation had already informed the European shipyards of the safeguards that the Navy would like incorporated in an Inter Government Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
Between June 1980 when the CCPA approved the collaboration with HDW for the SSK Project and December 1981 when the contracts were signed, there were detailed discussions to formulate the MOU. The best that could be achieved was an 'Agreement on Technical Assistance' between the German and Indian Ministries of Defence. This was signed in July 1981.
Contracts Signed on 11 December 1981
After detailed negotiations, contracts were signed in on 11 December 1981:
- To build two submarines at the HDW yard in Germany, where Indian personnel would acquire practical training in submarine construction techniques and Indian naval architects and overseers would learn how to design, understudy how to build and oversee the construction of submarines.
- To transfer technology and material packages to MDL for building two more submarines in India. MD personnel would acquire on job training in Germany during the period when the first two submarines were under construction.
- Giving the Indian side the option of ordering material packages for two more submarines before December 1982 at the same baseline cost as the first four submarines.
- Supply of wire guided torpedoes.
Subsequently, in 1985, a contract was signed for the SSK Simulator for installation in the Submarine Headquarters Complex in Bombay.
Teams Deputed to Germany for Overseeing Construction and Design Technology
The teams deputed to the HDW shipyard at Kiel were:
- Overseeing and Quality Control Teams of the two submarines to be built there.
- Key personnel of the commissioning crews.
- Base and Dockyard Teams to undergo training for manning, maintaining and repairing sonar, torpedoes, shafting, main diesel, compressors, auxiliary machinery, hydraulic systems, damage control, power generation distribution and propulsion, ESM, gyro and navigation aids, refrigeration and air conditioning, etc.
- Material Management and Logistics Group and the Documentation Cell.
The Submarine Design Team was deputed to IKat Lubeck and the Naval Armament Inspectors were deputed to Wede to inspect and accept the torpedoes.
Submarine Construction Schedule
- 12 months for planning.
- 6 months for preparation of detailed engineering drawings.
- 6 months for part fabrication and assembly of subunits.
- 12 months for complete fabrication.
- 6 months on the pontoon for fitting out.
- 6 months for sea trials escorted by a HDW vessel.
- Total time 48 months.
Commencement of the Type 1500 Design by IKL
IKL started work on the detailed design only after the conclusion of the contract because the weight and volume calculations could only be carried out during placement of orders.
To aid production by HDW, IK produced a finished model of the Type 1500 submarine. All equipment, machinery, cables and pipe fittings were modeled. Three Indian Navy shipwrights participated in the production of this model.
Transfer of Submarine Design Technology
The programme for the transfer of design technology was formulated through extensive discussion between IKL and NHQ. It was decided that the ideal method for achieving this would be in two distinct phases:
By a combination of formal lectures and discussions with IK experts, IK would give to the Design Team complete details of the design of the Type 1500 submarine.
To check whether the Design Team had fully understood the complexities of submarine design, it would, under the guidance and supervision of IKL's experts, develop de novo a new design according to the staff requirements specified by NHQ.
Design Training started in 1982. By mid 1984, 98% of the syllabus was completed and the Design Team became fully occupied with the de novo design.
Construction of SSKs 1 and 2 in Germany
Captain (later Rear Admiral) DN Thukral, an experienced submariner, was deputed to HDW as the leader of the Indian Naval Submarine Overseeing Team (INSOT) from 1982 to 1987 when the first two submarines were under construction in Germany. He recalls:
“In Germany, Professor Gabler was known as the 'Father of Submarine Design.' Ingeneer Kontor Lubeck (IKL), the design arm and Machinen Bow Gabler, the manufacturing arm, were located in contiguous premises he looked after both of these. While we were there, he turned 75, there was a big function, and he handed over charge of both the design and the manufacturing aspect to two directors who had been with him for a number of years. It was a very professionally run organisation.
“Our submarines were designed by Professor Gabler. He was with us throughout the period when HDW was constructing our submarines. There is no doubt that his experience was unbeatable. He treated the Indian Design Team with great respect because he realised that the IQ level of the technical officers that the Navy had sent was high. He was with them not only at the senior level, but also at the junior level when they were doing the design and doing mock ups. He would saunter into the Design Room and interact with our people. He really was a 'father figure'. I have a lot of respect for him.
“There were two separate contracts one for the submarines to be built in Germany and one for the submarines to be built by MDL. There was a dual responsibility. Firstly, to inspect the submarines being built in Germany and secondly to build the submarines in India.
“The task of building the submarines in India was that of Mazagon Docks. Their team was the first to arrive in Germany. They had been carefully selected to learn all aspects of submarine construction. MDL's team was also responsible for the inspection of the German material packages to be shipped to India for the 3rd and 4th submarines.
“Right from the initial planning stages, it was decided at Naval Headquarters that there had to be a dual presence in the shipyard at Kiel. The first was that of the Naval overseers who were directly from the Navy as the Indian Naval Submarine Overseeing Team. The second presence was of MD who had to learn how to build the submarine, how the material package was to be dispatched to India in a phased and timely manner and to ensure that the inspectors who were from the Navy would eventually transfer their expertise to MDL.
“In the overseeing team I had two categories of people. The first lot were there for approximately a year and a half they were supposed to learn their part of it, then go back to India and start the inspections for the first one and a half years of the MD programme. By this time, the rest of the Kiel team would have learnt the balance part of inspections and would go back to India and take on the specialised inspections of the latter half.
“My team had technical professionals from the Engineering, the Electrical and the Hull side. We laid down our own priorities. Quality was to be Number One priority because there is nothing like a 99% safe submarine; it has to be 101% safe. The second priority was Timely Completion. Most projects had the bad reputation of having time and cost overruns. Quality and Time were the two major aspects that we looked at, at every stage.
“I must highlight that we were concurrently learning and applying the knowledge to inspection. We were learning from the German Organisation called the BWB, which oversees quality assurance for the German Navy, as well as for a foreign Government if the foreign Government decides to use their facility. It was recommended by HDW that BWB were meant for this purpose and, for a small fee, one could use their facilities. So we had a presence of BWB in the shipyard.
“Initially, we learnt fro
Exactly a year ago I wrote about
However I still believe that
IMAGESHACK PROBLEM FOLLOW STEPS :-However, at the same time, materials and chemical researchers were learning to perform nanoscale fabrication, acquiring a new level of ability to manipulate matter. Nanomaterials are now being sold and promise to become a very big business. The fact that nanomaterials research doesn't have the least prospect of producing a gray-goo dissassembler doesn't mean that worries have forgotten. In October 2007, Dr. Andrew Maynard, a nanotech specialist at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC, stood up in front of a Congressional committee to hold up a packet of carbon nanotubes: Dr. Maynard pointed out that he had got the packet through the posts, and it was described as nothing more than graphite.
Superficially, that is true. Graphite is formed of planes of carbon atoms, with each plane made up of a mesh of hexagonal cells of atoms. Carbon nanotubes amount to the mesh rolled up into a tube, while similar carbon "buckyballs" are spheres formed out of that mesh. It is also true that such carbon nanostructures can be found in natural soot, but are they really as safe as graphite powder? Maybe they are, but given our state of knowledge about nanomaterials, we don't know enough to say one way or another. Another participant in the congressional hearing, Dr. Vicki Colvin -- a professor of chemistry at Rice University in Houston and a leader in nanotechnology risk research -- told the group: "If you fund five teams to understand nanotube toxicity, and they get five different answers, your research investment hurts you because it creates uncertainty. The bad news is that we have way over five different opinions about carbon-nanotube toxicity right now."
* Hundreds of products claiming to be nanomaterials-based are now on the market. In most cases, the only sense in which they are nanotech is that they use materials reduced to powders with particles a few nanometers -- billionths of a meter -- in diameter. In some cases, the particles are manipulated into structures such as rings, shells, beads, cages, and wires.
Some nanotech products are applied directly to the skin, for example cosmetics and sunscreens. Titanium dioxide has long been used as a sunscreen, being generally stereotyped as a white paste -- but the latest sunscreens use titanium dioxide nanoparticles, allowing them to block ultraviolet while passing visible light, making them more or less transparent. Silver nanoparticles are also popular since they can have antimicrobial properties, and they are used in products from bed linen to teddy bears to chopsticks to food preparation gear. The food industry is interested in using nanomaterial processing to include trace metals in foods and to make them less fattening.
Once people start talking about nanoparticles in food, nobody has to be a ranting luddite monkey-wrencher to stop and worry about matters for a moment. To be sure, we inhale and ingest nanoparticles from the environment all the time, but then again, we know that a portion of those nanoparticles, such as particulates from diesel engine exhaust, aren't good for us. Any chemist will freely admit that making supposedly harmless materials into nanoparticles may have unpredictable properties simply due to their small size. Bulk copper is soft, while copper nanoparticles are hard. Bulk gold is nonreactive, while gold nanoparticles react easily. Materials, such as carbon, that are safe enough in bulk form may become unsafe in nanoparticle form.
In fact, there's plenty of good reason to worry that may be the case. The reactivity of materials tends to increase with surface area, and given that volume deceases by the cube of the diameter while surface area decreases by the square, the ratio of surface area to volume gets much bigger at small sizes. Half the atoms of a five-nanometer particle are on its surface. Research suggests that nanoparticles could penetrate the body's defensive systems and accumulate in the brain, cells, blood, and nerves. There are suggestions that nanoparticles could cause pulmonary inflammation; move from the lungs to other organs; demonstrate surprising toxicity; be scavenged up by the lymphatic system; and possibly move across cell membranes. Worse, these phenomena tend to vary according to different nanoparticle configurations.
The applications of nanomaterials perceived as the most sensitive involve those that go in or on the body: food additives, cosmetics, drug delivery systems, new therapeutics, plus textile coatings and treatments. However, there are broader concerns: carbon nanotubes have been used for a number of years in plastics as a stiffener, and to make paints and the like conductive. What happens when products using such plastics and paints are dumped or broken up? Will the nanotubes enter the groundwater?
* In 2004, Britain's Royal Society recommended that nanomaterials be treated as entirely new substances as far as regulatory actions were concerned. Unfortunately, trying to assess the "environmental, health, & safety (EHS)" risks is troublesome.
Some governments don't see a particular issue over nanomaterials. Companies are responsible for the safety of their products to begin with, and so the specific nature of those products shouldn't make any difference -- if the products have been demonstrated to be safe, they will be certified as safe; if they haven't, they won't be allowed on the market. This is a reasonable point of view -- except for the fact that nanomaterials open up such a Pandora's box of ugly questions that it isn't reasonable to simply assume companies can do the job of assessing the EHS risks of nanomaterials themselves.
Many companies involved are not complacent about the issue, either, and are trying to come up with tests of their own so they can determine the nature and extent of problems. Big companies actually have the capability to perform very credible research on the subject, since they're familiar with the regulatory environment and have good research staffs. The same is not necessarily true of the smaller companies, and some of them have simply shrugged the matter off: "Titanium dioxide is a perfectly safe material, isn't it? Why should titanium dioxide nanopowders be any different?" Insurers are in a foggy state as well, and for the moment have simply shrugged and included nanomaterials as part of their general product liability coverage.
However, over the longer term, insurers have a strong vested interest in making sure that nanomaterials don't pose a significant EHS hazard. Governments also have a vested interest in making sure that nanomaterials are safe, since they will shoulder much of the blame if they aren't. The general belief is that government funding being pumped into nanotech development at this time should include money for EHS risk evaluation. The relevant businesses see that as all for the good, with the Nanotechnology Industries Association, a British trade group, calling for better coordination on risk evaluation research.
The Council for Science & Technology, an advisory group to the British government, has warned that research into the EHS risks of nanotech is going much too slowly, and in America some members of Congress have lit into the US government's National Nanotechnology Initiative for its lack of focus on safety issues. The US government currently spends the most money on nanotech research, estimated to be as much as $60 million USD a year. However, Dr. Maynard and his colleagues have suggested a program to perform EHS risk evaluation for nanotech that will need $100 million USD a year, at least until the level of risks are understood.
There is a lot of work to do. Regulation of any sort of materials use is based on measurement, monitoring, and risk estimation, and right now there's little ability to do any of that with regards to nanomaterials. We don't even have common terminology or tools to measure nanomaterials, characterise them, and assess their purity. Work towards that end is being coordinated by the International Standards Organization (ISO) in Geneva, Switzerland, and the general expectation is that it will happen.
Can it happen soon enough? Nobody is promoting a hysterical view of nanomaterials, claiming we're on the edge of a global disaster; the issue is that we simply don't have the knowledge to understand if they are really safe or not. That uncertainty casts a cloud over the nanomaterials industry, even as governments pump in money to ramp up work and produce significant new products -- new therapeutics, better batteries, cleaning up water, generating green energy. Getting rid of that cloud makes work on the EHS risks of nanotech very important; and on the positive side, once the risks are better understood, the money pumped into nanotech will go farther since it won't be sunk into dead-end research paths.
Vulnerability management often fails at the point where security mandates collide with IT operations, creating a Priority Gap between vulne...